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twenty years was a belief that privatization would increase economic eﬃciency. There are now many
studies showing most privatizations achieved this goal. Our theme is that the productivity gains
from privatization are much more general and widespread than has typically been recognized in this
literature. In assessing the productivity gains from privatization, the literature has only examined
the productivity gains accruing at the privatized SOEs. But privatization may have signiﬁcant
impact on the private producers that often exist side-by-side with SOEs. In this paper we show
that this was indeed the case when Brazil privatized its SOEs in the iron ore industry. That is,
after their privatization, the iron ore SOEs dramatically increased their labor productivity, but so
did the private iron ore companies in the industry.
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Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.A major motivation for the wave of privatizations of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
in the last twenty years was a belief that privatization would increase economic eﬃciency.
There are now many studies showing most privatizations achieved this goal. Our theme
is that the productivity gains from privatization are much more general and widespread
than has typically been recognized in this literature. In assessing the productivity gains
from privatization, the literature has only examined the productivity gains accruing at the
privatized SOEs. But privatization may have signiﬁcant impact on the private producers
that often exist alongside SOEs. In this paper we show that this was indeed the case when
Brazil privatized its SOEs in the iron ore industry. That is, after their privatization, the
iron ore SOEs dramatically increased their labor productivity, but so did the private iron ore
companies in the industry.
As far as we know, there are no studies looking at the impact of SOE privatization on
the productivity of private ﬁrms. Hence, before we turn to the Brazilian iron ore industry, we
brieﬂy argue that this issue (of privatization’s impact on private productivity) deserves much
more attention. First, we present evidence that it’s very common to have public and private
production side by side in industries. For example, in over half of the countries studied by La
Porta, et al (2002), both government-controlled and private-controlled banks had signiﬁcant
shares of banking assets. Second, we present two reasons (there are likely many more) why
privatization of SOEs in an industry would lead to increases in private ﬁrm productivity in
that industry. One is that it’s very common for governments to place production-restrictions
on the private competitors of SOEs. A major reason for these restrictions is to limit SOE
losses and hence the subsidies paid to them. Even in the United Sates we see important
examples of this, such as when the U.S. Postal Service puts restrictions on private deliveryservices like FedEx (as when it forbids FedEx to use private mailboxes). Also, in industries
where unions represent workers at both SOE and private ﬁrms, the union often chooses
to initially bargain with the SOE (it chooses the public ﬁrm as the “target”). Since SOE
managers typically ﬁnd it less “costly” to give generous wage and work rule packages as
compared to private managers, unions reach agreements with SOEs ﬁrst and then use them
as leverage in later negotiations with private ﬁrms.
Having established the proposition that privatization’s impact on private productivity
is an important issue to understand, we turn to the Brazilian iron ore case. We brieﬂyd i s c u s s
the history of iron-ore privatization in Brazil and our data sources. Prior to privatization,
SOEs accounted for roughly 60 percent of Brazilian iron ore production. We then show that
there was little labor productivity gain in the Brazilian iron-ore industry until the onset of
the privatization process in 1989. Then, industry productivity dramatically increased, more
than doubling over the next decade. We then show that this pattern was found in both the
public and private ﬁrms in the industry. That is, following the onset of the privatization
process in 1989, both sets of ﬁrms roughly doubled their labor productivity during the 1990s.
Next, we discuss the sources of productivity gains. Interviews with management at
the massive public company CVRD (Companhia Vale do Rio Doce) indicated there were two
major sources of productivity gains. First, there were gains arising from eliminating layers
of redundant administration and management. Second, there were gains from changes in
work practices among employees at the mines. Traditionally, employees engaged in only a
small range of tasks. With the onset of privatization, employees became responsible for a
much wider range of tasks. Privatization impacted the private ﬁrms primarily through the
second channel discussed above. That is, the union representing iron ore workers traditionally
2had been able to extend (at least in good part) the wages and work practices at the public
companies to the private ﬁrms. With the public companies requiring greater ranges of tasks
of its employees, the private ﬁrms made similar changes. In section 7 we conclude.
Finally, a brief word on the literature. There is a very large literature examining the
impact of SOE privatization on SOE productivity. This literature is reviewed, for example,
in Megginson and Netter (2001). The literature typically ﬁnds large productivity gains at
SOEs following privatization, a leading example being Laporta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999).
There is also a literature that compares productivity in public and private ﬁrms, asking which
are more eﬃcient (e.g., the reviews by Borcherding, Pommerehne and Schneider (1982) and
Megginson and Netter (2001)). But, again, as far as we know, there is no literature that
looks at the impact of SOE privatization on private productivity. This is an important issue
and we begin examining it here.
1. Public and Private Production Side by Side
In this section we brieﬂy present evidence that public and private production exist
side by side in many industries. We won’t present a complete list of industries where this
is true but one extensive enough to justify our interest in asking how privatization of SOEs
inﬂuences their private counterparts.
The most extensive cross-country evidence on private and public production is avail-
able for the banking industry. La Porta, et al. (2002) have constructed measures of the share
of banking assets owned by the government in a wide range of countries. The measures show
that within a country it is common to have banking services provided by both public and
private ﬁrms. Let us focus on one of their measures. They say that a bank is controlled
3by the government at the 50 percent level if the government owns 50 percent of the bank.
They then look at the top 10 banks in a country in 1995 and ask which, if any, are con-
trolled by the government (at the 50 percent level). They then ask what share of assets these
government-controlled banks own relative to all top 10 bank assets. Of the 80 countries in
their sample (we have excluded the few socialist countries), the government-controlled banks
owned between 20 and 80 percent of top 10 bank assets in 41 of the countries. In over half
the countries both government-controlled and private-controlled banks had signiﬁcant shares
of banking assets (that is, both had shares over 20 percent).
Public and private production exist side by side in manufacturing as well. For manu-
facturing and the other industries we discuss below, there is nothing like the data constructed
by La Porta, et al. (2002) for banking. Rather, we must make due with evidence for a few
countries. Turning to manufacturing, in Egypt the government’s share of production in the
machinery, nonmetallic minerals, metal products and transportation equipment industries in
1966-67 was 75, 65, 51 and 59 percent, respectively. In Turkey, the government’s share of
production in the same industries in 1968 was 15, 31, 46 and 50 percent, respectively (for
these statistics see Schmitz (2001)). In Mexico, La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) report
that SOE enterprises produced throughout the manufacturing sector, in industries such as
beverages, textiles, chemicals, basic metals and transportation equipment. Unfortunately, for
our purposes, they do not report the SOE share of production in these industries.
Both public and private production is also common in transportation industries. Take
the case of railroads. In Canada, there were historically two major railroads that accounted
for most freight hauling, a large pubic railroad, Canadian National (CN) and a large private
one, Canadian Paciﬁc (CP). In 1990, CN accounted for 51.4 percent of ton-miles of freight,
4with the private railroads accounting for 48.6 percent (CP accounted for 39 percent and small,
non-class I railroads 9.5 percent).1 A report by the Productivity Commission in Australia
on railroads (1991) shows that public and private freight railroads exist side by side in many
other countries. In Australia, government and private railroads accounted for 62 and 38
percent of ton-miles of freight in 1988-89, respectively.
What is true in railroads is also true in airlines: public and private air carriers exist side
by side. In Australia, there were historically two major domestic airlines, Trans Australian
Airways (TAA), a government ﬁrm, and Ansett Australian National Airways (Ansett ANA),
ap r i v a t eﬁrm. The public airline accounted for 34 and 45 percent of freight and passenger
traﬃc, respectively, in 1968-69, with the private airline accounting for the rest (see Davies,
1971). In most European countries there has traditionally been a large government carrier
and a host of smaller, private carriers.
Finally, mail and package delivery is also an industry with both public and private
services. In the United States, there is a single SOE–the U.S. Postal Service. There also are
a large number of private producers, most notably FedEx. The same situation exists in most
European countries as well, that is, of a single government mail service and a host of private
carriers.
2. Privatization’s Impact on Private Productivity: Theory
In this section we ask why privatization of SOEs in an industry would lead to increases
in private ﬁrm productivity in that industry (or, similarly, why government production in an
industry would lead to low productivity of private producers). We argue that “stakeholders”
1These ﬁgures can be constructed from Coates and Downie (1999) and Timur and Ponak (2002).
5in the SOEs (like members of the ruling party or SOE managers) take actions that lead to
lower private productivity. Here, we discuss two types of actions.
A. Production Restrictions Placed on Private Producers
It is very common for governments to place production restrictions on the private
competitors of SOEs. For example, private ﬁrms are sometimes severely limited in the input
or technology choices they can make. Here, we sketch some simple logic as to why such
production restrictions would emerge in an industry with SOEs, and then present a few
examples of such restrictions around the world.
It is widely recognized that members of government often use SOEs as a vehicle to
reward their constituents. SOEs are often used to provide jobs to supporters.2 Such job
“programs” can, of course, lead to losses for the SOE. It is not hard to imagine that with
private ﬁrms in the industry, the losses associated with SOE job programs can grow over time
and become very large. For example, suppose that private labor productivity grows faster
than public. There will then be a tendency for private producers to capture more of the
market. If the SOE’s share of the market is falling, then the losses for the SOE associated
with maintaining a given level of employment grows over time.
Large losses by SOEs means that subsidies must be paid to them. This can be po-
litically costly since the subsidies can be interpreted (in this case, correctly) as signals of
nepotism, corruption, and the like. Hence, the government has a strong incentive to elimi-
nate these subsidies. One method is to put restrictions on private ﬁrm behavior so as to limit
2There is some theory to explain why government members would make transfers to constituents in ways
(like providing jobs) that did not involve simply monetary payments, that is, in seemingly ineﬃcient ways
(see, e.g., Coate and Morris (1995)).
6their eﬃciency. By limiting the productivity growth of private ﬁrms, the government can
alleviate the problem alluded to above where private producers capture market share over
time. While such tactics do lead to less subsidies, there are obviously costs to the economy.
It’s as if the government moves the subsidies “oﬀ-budget” where they are much more diﬃcult
to detect.
We give two examples where governments protect their SOEs by putting production
restrictions on private ﬁrms. Recall that Australia had a policy of permitting only two
domestic airlines, one private and one public. As Davies (1971) reports, the government
endeavored to insure that the private airline did not harm the SOE. For example, for each
route in Australia, the government would determine biannually the expected capacity in ton-
miles for the route over the next six months. The two airlines would then receive the right
to carry exactly one-half that ton-mile capacity over the period. Neither airline could carry
more than that capacity over the period. But the government soon realized that this was
not enough to protect the SOE. By choosing a better mix of aircraft, the private airline was
able to make proﬁts (and cause the public airline to make losses). So the government started
requiring that the airlines have the same ﬂeet of aircraft! In summarizing the consequences
of such government intervention, Forsyth and Hocking (1980, p. 182) argue
In such a situation, there is little scope for the private airline to be more eﬃcient
than the public one, and it is doubtful whether individuals associated with the
private one are permitted to have any more incentives to improve eﬃciency. Any
incentives in this system must ﬁnally be reduced to very low levels by the strong
de facto controls on the proﬁts of the private airline.
7As another example, consider the mail and package delivery industry. In the United
States, the U.S. Postal Service is able to put restrictions on private delivery services. These
restrictions include the regulation that private companies are prohibited from placing items in
mailboxes. Amazingly, the Postal Service itself has the power to issue regulations regarding
mail service (see Smith, 2004). In his statement before the U.S. Senate regarding the issue of
postal reform, Fred Smith, the CEO of FedEx, stressed how the restriction on private ﬁrms
from placing items in mailboxes led these companies to be less eﬃcient. He urged dropping
this restriction, arguing that “the end result of this reform will be to make the nation’s
delivery services sector more eﬃcient by extending the eﬃciencies of the national mailbox
system to private delivery services.”
B. SOEs Used as “Targets” in Pattern Bargaining
In industries where unions represent workers at both an SOE and private ﬁrms, the
union often chooses to initially bargain with the SOE (it chooses the public ﬁrm as the
“target”). After reaching an agreement, the union uses the deal as leverage in bargaining
with the private ﬁrms. The goal, of course, is to achieve a better deal than if the bargaining
was not done sequentially. Here, we sketch some simple logic as to why SOEs are often used
as targets and then present a few examples of such bargaining around the world.
While the theoretical literature on pattern bargaining is small, and results limited, it’s
not hard to imagine models where the union would ﬁrst bargain with the ﬁrm most willing to
give a generous agreement and then use this to threaten other ﬁrms with strikes, etc., if they
do not follow the target. In this regard, it is widely recognized that managers of SOEs are
8likely to have weaker proﬁt incentives than managers of private ﬁrms.3 Hence, SOE managers
ﬁnd it less “costly” to give generous wage and work rule packages as compared to private
managers. This would suggest bargaining ﬁrst with the SOE and then private ﬁrms. Where
private productivity enters this discussion is through the work rule agreements and the like
that are part of these labor agreements (see below).
Let us give two examples where unions use SOEs as targets to leverage generous private
agreements. Recall Canada’s railroad industry was comprised of two ﬁrms, one public, one
private. In trying to extend beneﬁts to their workers, rail unions typically followed this
pattern of ﬁrst bargaining with the public railroad. As one example, Timur and Ponak
(2002) discuss how in the late 1980s the public railroad gave signiﬁcant job protection to
employees. In particular, shop craft employees with more than eight years of experience were
guaranteed full pay if their jobs were eliminated through new technology and if no suitable
substitute position was found. Timur and Ponak quote a senior private ﬁrm executive as
saying “CNR [the public ﬁrm] ﬁrst negotiated it [the job guarantees]. Then it became a
tactical issue whether we would take a strike, lose business permanently perhaps, and the
decision was taken not to strike.”
In Brazil, there was a single union, Sindicato Metabase (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores
da Industria de Metais de Base), that represented workers at both the public and private iron
ore mines. The union followed the same practice as that in the Canadian railroad industry.
That is, the union would ﬁrst reach agreement with public ﬁr m sa n dt h e nu s et h i sa sl e v e r a g e
with the private mines. Interviews with Sindicato Metabase staﬀ indicated that the types
3It is diﬃcult to arrange compensation schemes for SOE managers that approximate those of private ﬁrm
managers.
9of pressure applied to private producers was sometimes diﬀe r e n tt h a nt h a tu s e di nC a n a d a
(i.e., of strikes). The labor union sometimes allied itself with local government oﬃcials to
jointly apply pressure on private mines to accept (in large part) the public contracts. Local
government oﬃcials could add to the union’s power since they often had to approve zoning
and other regulations under which the mines operated.
3. Brazilian Iron Ore Privatization: Background
In this section we brieﬂy discuss the history of iron ore privatization in Brazil and also
the sources of our data.
A. Iron Ore Privatization
In the Brazilian iron ore industry there were two public companies that owned mines,
CSN (Companhia Siderugica Nacional) and CVRD (Companhia Vale do Rio Doce). CSN was
primarily a steel producer; in fact, it was Brazil’s largest (see Andrade, Cunha and Gandra
(2002)). It owned a single mine. CVRD was primarily an iron ore producer, a massive one.
In 1990, CSN produced about 6 million metric tons (mmt), CVRD 85 mmt, and Brazil 152
mmt. The only country that produced more iron ore than CVRD in 1990 was Australia (110
mmt). The next closest country was the United Sates (56 mmt).4
The CSN mine was the ﬁrst sold to private investors. Steel industry privatization was
initiated in 1988 with the Plan for Restructuring the Siderbras System. Siderbras (Siderurgia
Brasileira SA) was a holding company of numerous steel companies (including CSN) owned
by the government. The process of privatizing CSN’s steel operation was completed in 1993,
4These statistics are from the United States Geological Society Minerals Yearbook. We are excluding China
and the U.S.S.R. from these rankings since these countries reported production diﬀerently than the rest of
the world.
10when the CSN mine was also sold.
While an oﬃcial plan to privatize CSN (and other steel makers) was announced in
1988, CVRD did not appear on oﬃcial privatization lists until much later, in fact, 1995. The
government had decided to sell CVRD well before this date (see below) but knew it was going
to face stiﬀ resistance to selling it (see Kandell (1997) for some of the diﬃculties faced in
selling CVRD). Hence, it delayed a formal announcement. CVRD was the crown jewel of
Brazilian state enterprises. The government had to placate many nationalist interests before
the sale. One restriction on the sale was that Australian iron ore producers (who were the
largest producers after Brazil) could not be part of a bidding consortium. Also kept out of
the bidding were Japanese steel producers. In the end, only two consortium, both led by
l o c a le n t r e p r e n e u r s ,b i do nC V R D .I tw a sﬁnally sold in 1997.
While the CVRD privatization process was not completed until 1997, both CVRD-
management and union oﬃcials were unanimous in agreeing that by 1989 it was evident that
CVRD would be privatized. By the early 1990s, CVRD was undergoing major reforms and
changes in its organization to prepare for privatization. Hence, in choosing a date that marks
the onset of the privatization process we chose 1989. While it probably became clear before
1989 that the CSN mine would be privatized (since a formal steel sector privatization program
was announced in 1988), for simplicity we have chosen a single year to mark the onset of the
privatization process.
B. Data Sources
The basic source of data for mining industries in Brazil, including iron ore, are annual
mine reports submitted to regional DNPM’s (Departamento Nacional de Producao Mineral
11- National Mineral Production Department). These reports include the mine’s production
(tons of iron ore by type of iron ore) and employment (as of the middle of December).
These reports are then submitted to the Ministry of Mine and Energy-MG for tabulation
of aggregate production and aggregate employment levels for Brazil. These are published in
Relatorio Anual de Lavras. We have aggregate industry data from 1972-1999.
In order to examine production and employment by mine, both private and public,
we used the archives of yearly mine reports at DNPM-MG. We limited our search of these
archives in the following way. First, there are a large number of very small iron ore ﬁrms in
Brazil. Hence, to limit the search we gathered mine records for the public companies, CSN
and CVRD, and for the three largest private companies, Ferteco (Ferteco Mineracao SA),
MBR (Mineracoes Brasileiras Reunidas SA) and Samitri. Second, it was diﬃcult to collect
records prior to 1986. Many reports for that period were not found. So we gathered mine
reports from 1986-98.5
We also decided to examine the data at the ﬁrm level and not the mine. While the
companies are supposed to report employment by mine, in practice the mines of a ﬁrm are
often close to each other so that some staﬀ (like repair staﬀ) may work in more than one
mine. Hence, it is up to the ﬁrm how to assign workers to mines in the reports. Moreover,
there are some mines that report production but no employment. Because of this, we have
chosen to look at production and productivity records at the ﬁrm level.
We have made one exception to this strategy of looking at performance at the ﬁrm
level. CVRD has operations in the South and the North of Brazil. Since these operations
5We collected the data in the mine reports in 2000 and at that time only reports through 1998 were
available.
12are separated by more than two thousand miles, the issues of repair staﬀ working in diﬀerent
mines, etc., is not a major issue. Hence, we break CVRD into two “ﬁrms,” CVRD-South
and CVRD-North. What we have constructed, then, is the output and employment records
of three public ﬁrms, CSN, CVRD-South, and CVRD-North, and the three largest private
ﬁrms, Ferteco, MBR and Samitri, from 1986 to 1998.
In Table 1, we present the production and productivity of these six ﬁrms, together with
the rest the industry, for 1990. Production by public ﬁrms (90.8 mmt) amounted to almost
60 percent of total production (152.2 mmt) in 1990. Production by the three largest private
ﬁrms (41.5 mmt) amounted to about 27 percent of total production. The small private ﬁrms
contributed about 13 percent of production. The production of the three largest ﬁrms (again,
41.5 mmt) would have ranked them as the fourth largest national producer, behind Australia
(110 mmt), the United States (56 mmt) and India (54 mmt), but ahead of the next largest
producers, Canada (35 mmt), South Africa (30 mmt) and Venezuela (20 mmt).
Productivity (deﬁned as thousands of metric tons per employee per year) varies widely
across ﬁrms. CVRD-North, which is the huge Carajas mine, has very high productivity, over
twice the industry average. CVRD-North’s high productivity was due to its very high quality
deposits. MBR and Ferteco had higher productivity than the other two public ﬁrms, CVRD-
South and CSN. The third large private ﬁrm, Samitri, had low productivity. However, Samitri
produced a type of iron ore, pellets, that requires more labor per ton than other ores. Hence,
its low productivity is not surprising. Also not surprising is that the “rest of the industry”
had very low productivity, less than half the industry average. The rest of the industry was
mostly comprised of very small ﬁrms that worked marginal deposits.
134. Privatization’s Impact on Productivity: Evidence
In this section we show that there was little productivity gain in the Brazilian iron ore
industry until the onset of privatization. Then industry productivity dramatically increased.
We also show this pattern was found in both the public and private ﬁrms in the industry.
A. Productivity and Production: Aggregate Industry
The production and productivity records of the Brazilian iron ore industry over the
period 1972-99 are given in Figure 1. In the ﬁgure we have drawn a vertical line at 1989 to
indicate the year when the privatization process began. In the ﬁgure, and all that follow,
production and productivity are normalized to one in 1990. Production increased by about
a factor of four from 1971 to 1990.6 There was very little increase in productivity over this
p e r i o d . I fw ee x a m i n et h ed e c a d eo ft h e1 9 8 0 s ,t h e r ew a sas m a l li n c r e a s ei np r o d u c t i v i t y
in the middle to late 1980s. This was primarily driven by the opening of CVRD-North,
the Carajas mine, in the middle 1980s. As we saw, CVRD-North had signiﬁcantly higher
productivity than all the other Brazilian producers, private and public. Its opening pulled
the industry average up a bit.7
Figure 1 shows that industry productivity increased signiﬁcantly with the onset of
privatization in 1989. It increased by a factor of more than two over the period 1990-99.
There were signiﬁcant gains prior to the culmination of the privatization process in 1997,
that is, from 1990-97, and then a major increase after CVRD was sold, that is, from 1997-99.
6Note that we have aggregate output from 1971, but aggregate employment only from 1972.
7The existence of the Carajas (CVRD-North) deposits had been known well before the middle 1980s.
However, they were located in the interior of the Amazon and massive infrastructure investment was needed
before the iron ore could be extracted and shipped to the coast. A World Bank project supplied these funds
in the middle 1980s.
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The productivity and production of the public ﬁrms over the period 1986-98 are given
in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. As can be seen in Figure 2, the general pattern of productivity
fro public ﬁrms is similar to the aggregate pattern: little productivity growth prior to the
onset of privatization in 1989 and then strong growth afterwards, from 1990-98. Here, of
course, we only have a few years of data prior to the onset of privatization. Also, we do not
have data for 1999 as we did for the aggregate industry.
T u r n i n gt ot h ei n d i v i d u a lﬁrms, CVRD-South had very little productivity gain from
1986-1989. Over 1990-98, its productivity more than doubled. CSN had few productiv-
ity gains between 1987 and 1989 (for CSN, 1987 is our ﬁrst year of data). Over 1990-98,
its productivity dramatically increased, by more than a factor of four. Recall that CSN’s
productivity had been signiﬁcantly lower than CVRD-South’s. Its spectacular productivity
growth likely reﬂects that it was run much more poorly than CVRD prior to privatization.
With its dramatic productivity growth it was essentially catching up to CVRD-South’s level.
Contrary to the other public ﬁrms, CVRD-North shows some productivity gains be-
tween 1986-88. This was primarily due to the fact that the Carajas mine had just opened
in the middle 1980s. When iron ore mines open, their productivity starts low for the ﬁrst
few years, until mine output reaches its rated capacity. CVRD-North was still in the process
of ramping up production during 1986-88. This can be seen in Figure 3. Here we see that
CVRD-North more than doubled output over 1986-88. Following the onset of privatization,
CVRD-North’s productivity roughly doubled over 1990-98.
Both CVRD-South and CVRD-North showed signiﬁcant productivity growth prior to
their formal sale in 1997 (and strong growth afterward too). This pattern of major productiv-
15ity gains in public ﬁrms before their formal privatization date is found in many privatization
studies. For example, Laporta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) examine the employment levels in
their sample of privatized ﬁrms in the four years leading up to the formal sale. On average,
employment fell signiﬁcantly in each of these years. In their Figure I, they show average
employment falls from a bit over 1450 in the fourth year before privatization to a bit over
1050 one year before privatization (a three year period). In the last year before privatiza-
tion, employment falls from a bit over 1050 to a bit over 550. Laporta and Lopez-de-Silanes
surmised that these major reductions in employment before privatization were part of the
government’s eﬀort to prepare the SOEs for sale. That is certainly what happened in this
industry: the large productivity gains at CVRD and CSN prior to privatization were due to
the government’s eﬀort to prepare these companies for sale (see below).
C. Productivity and Production: Large Private Firms
The productivity and production of the three largest private ﬁrms over the period
1986-98 are given in Figures 4 and 5, respectively. As can be seen in Figure 4, the general
pattern of productivity for private ﬁrms is similar to the aggregate pattern: little productivity
growth prior to the onset of privatization and then strong growth afterwards. If there is a
diﬀerence between the patterns in Figures 2 and 4 it is that much of the private productivity
gains were bunched closer to the formal sale of CVRD in 1997. Here, again, we only have a
few years of data prior to the onset of privatization, and also not for 1999.
Turning to the individual ﬁrms, Ferteco had very little productivity gain from 1986-
1989. Over 1990-98, its productivity nearly doubled. MBR had little productivity growth
between 1986-88. Its productivity growth started earlier than the other ﬁrms and it experi-
16enced signiﬁcant growth over 1988-91. It experienced another surge in productivity beginning
in 1995, as CVRD’s sale was announced. Over the course of 1990-98, its productivity more
than doubled. At Samitri, productivity showed much larger year to year swings than at the
other ﬁve ﬁrms (that is, the three public and two private ﬁrms). This may have been due
to problems at some of its mines (such as major breakdowns of processing facilities) as its
output also shows much greater variation than the other ﬁrms (see Figures 3 and 5). Samitri’s
productivity in 1993 is, in fact, similar to that in 1986. Subsequent to 1993, its productivity
trends upward, with its biggest gains starting in 1995 when CVRD’s sale was announced.
5. Sources of productivity gain
In this section, we brieﬂy address the question of the sources of the very large labor
productivity gains at both the public and private mines following the onset of privatization.
Interviews with management at CVRD indicated there were two major sources of
productivity gains. First, there were gains due to reorganization of management. For many
management tasks, there was a separate management team in the south and the north. But
for many of these tasks, only a single management team was needed. During the privatization
process, in the early 1990s, much of this management redundancy was eliminated.
The second major source of gain at CVRD was due to changes in work practices among
employees at the mines. As was common in the United States and Canada, work practices
in Brazilian iron ore mines were such that employees engaged in only a small range of tasks.
For example, there was typically a sharp separation of repair and production work. Those
workers who ran machinery, for example, were not permitted to tend to their machines – this
was reserved for repair staﬀ. As another example, there were many repair job classiﬁcations.
17Repair staﬀ with a certain classiﬁcation were not permitted to conduct repairs assigned to
other job classiﬁcations. In the US and Canada, these work practices changed in the early
to middle 1980s, as these iron ore industries were faced with the possibility of closure (see
Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz (2002) and Schmitz (2004)). But they persisted in Brazil until
the onset of the privatization process. In the early 1990s, the management at CVRD began
changing contracts so as to require workers to be responsible for more tasks. This process
was called polivalente, the Portuguese term for jack of all trades.
Let us emphasize that both these major changes at CVRD were introduced before its
formal sale. They were instituted so as to make CVRD a more attractive ﬁrm to purchase
thus enabling the government to raise more at its sale.
Many of the changes at CVRD were also be introduced at the private ﬁrms; in par-
ticular, the move toward polivalente. The workers at the private ﬁrms had beneﬁted from
the narrow job classiﬁcations at CVRD as a result of the pattern bargaining. But once such
beneﬁts faded at CVRD, they were also lost at the private companies. That such changes
in work practices that occurred at CVRD and the private ﬁrms could have had signiﬁcant
eﬀects on labor productivity is clear from the work of Schmitz (2004). He studies the U.S.
and Canadian iron ore industries, which doubled labor productivity over the middle 1980s.
He has access to more industry data than was available in Brazil. In particular, the United
States and Canada publish capital stock and materials data for their iron ore industries. He
shows that much of the doubling of labor productivity in the United States and Canada in
the middle 1980s was due to changes in work practices, changes similar to those in Brazil.
186. Conclusion
Our theme has been that the productivity gains from privatization are much more
general and widespread than has typically been recognized in the literature. This is because
privatization of SOEs in an industry will typically lead to increases in private ﬁrm productivity
in that industry – an inﬂuence that has been ignored in the literature.
We began by establishing that this issue, the impact of SOE privatization on private
ﬁrm productivity, is an important one. We did this by showing that public and private
production exist side-by-side in many industries and in many countries. We then presented
some reasons why SOE privatization would raise private ﬁrm productivity.
We then turned to the privatization of SOEs in Brazil’s iron ore industry. We showed
that there was little productivity gain in the industry until the onset of privatization. Then
there was signiﬁcant productivity growth at both the public and private ﬁrms in the industry.
We then argued that much of the private productivity gain was due to forces set in motion
with the privatization of the public companies.
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Firm Production




    CSN 5.83 3.83 7.40 0.81
    CVRD-South 52.12 34.24 9.66 1.06
    CVRD-North 32.85 21.58 24.17 2.66
Large Private Firms
    Ferteco 10.93 7.18 10.58 1.17
    MBR 19.97 13.11 14.92 1.64
    Samitri 10.61 6.97 5.63 0.62
Rest of Industry 19.93 13.09 4.02 0.44
Total Industry 152.24 100.00 9.08 1.00
Note: Production in millions of metric tons (mmt)
          Productivity is thousands of tons per employee per year
          Source: see text.
Table 1
Brazilian Iron Ore Production and Labor Productivity, 1990
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